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19.1  IntroduCtIon
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are emerging as both an important new tier in the IT (informa-
tion technology) ecosystem and a rich domain of active research involving hardware and system 
design, networking, distributed algorithms, programming models, data management, security, 
and social factors [1,2]. The basic idea of a sensor network is to disperse tiny sensing devices 
over a specific target area. These devices are capable of sensing certain changes of incidents or 
parameters and of communicating with other devices. WSNs could be very useful for providing 
support for some specific purposes, such as target tracking, surveillance, environmental moni-
toring, etc. Today’s sensors can monitor temperature, pressure, humidity, soil makeup, vehicular 
movement, noise levels, lighting conditions, the presence or absence of certain kinds of objects 
or substances, mechanical stress levels on attached objects, and other properties. As such types 
of networks are composed of resource-constrained tiny sensor nodes, many research works have 
tried to focus on efficient use of the available resources of the sensors. Energy is, in fact, one 
of the most critical factors that play a great role to define the duration of an active and operable 
network. Energy efficiency is often very crucial in these sorts of networks as the power sources 
of the inexpensive sensors are (in most of the cases) not replaceable after deployment. If any 
intermediate node between any two communicating nodes runs out of battery power, the link 
between the end nodes is eventually broken. So any protocol should ensure a competent way of 
utilizing the energies of the sensors so that a fair connectivity of the network could be ensured 
throughout its operation time. Energy efficiency is also very necessary to maximize the lifetime 
of the network.
Security, on the other hand, is another critical issue, especially for ensuring the legitimacy of 
transmitted readings from the sensors to the base station [3,4]. It is anticipated that, in most appli-
cation domains, sensor networks constitute an information source that is a mission critical system 
component and, thus, require commensurate security protection. If an adversary can thwart the 
work of the network by perturbing the information produced, stopping production, or pilfering 
information, then the usefulness of sensor networks is drastically curtailed. Thus, it should be made 
sure that the messages from the sensors in action are authentic and reach the base station without 
any fabrication or modification. As a strong property of security, authenticity of the messages is 
often considered as the most crucial.
The task of securing wireless sensor networks is, however, complicated, considering the fact 
that the sensors are mass-produced anonymous devices with a severely limited energy budget 
and, initially, with no knowledge of their locations in the deployment environment (in general 
cases). The architectural aspect of wireless sensor networks could make the employment of 
a security scheme a little bit easier as the base stations or the centralized entities could be 
used extensively in this case. Nevertheless, the major challenge is induced by the constraint of 
resources of the tiny sensors. In many cases, sensors are expected to be deployed arbitrarily 
in the enemy territory (especially in a military reconnaissance scenario) or over dangerous or 
hazardous areas. Therefore, even if the base station (or sink) resides in the friendly and safe 
area, the sensor nodes need to be protected from being compromised. At least, it should be 
made sure that the reports that reach the base station are authentic and are not corrupted on the 
way of transmission.
In this chapter, we deal with the challenge of energy efficiency and secure routing in wireless 
sensor networks in a highly dense deployment scenario. We propose a secure energy-efficient rout-
ing protocol (SERP) [23], which aims at minimizing the wasteful energy consumption by energy-
efficient structuring of the network and then securing the data transmissions from the sensors to the 
base station using a one-way hash chain and shared secret keys. SERP selects a minimum number 
of forwarding nodes in the network. It provides a good level of confidentiality and authenticity of 
the reports sent from the source sensors to the base station.
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The major contributions of this chapter are the following:
 1. Energy and distance-based efficient structuring of the network, which helps for maximiz-
ing the lifetime of the network.
 2. Providing data transmission security in wireless sensor networks. Here, we have mainly 
focused on data authenticity and confidentiality during their transmissions from the 
source sensors to the base station. There is also an optional key refreshment mechanism 
in our scheme, which could be applied based on the application at hand to provide data 
freshness.
 3. Detailed analysis and simulation results of our proposed protocol.
 4. Overview of security in WSN along with discussion on the impact of different network 
structures on the security in WSN.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 19.2 presents an overview of the threats 
and attacks against WSNs, Section 19.3 presents the literature review and motivation of this work, 
Section 19.4 presents our assumptions and preliminaries, Section 19.5 describes our protocol in 
detail, simulation results and analysis are presented in Section 19.6, and Section 19.7 discusses the 
possible inclusion of intrusion detection systems (IDSs) based on the network structure and use of 
SERP as the routing protocol. Finally, Section 19.8 concludes the chapter delineating the achieve-
ments from this work with future research directions.
19.2  Wsn seCurIty and threats and attaCks 
agaInst Wsn at a glanCe
There are mainly three angles of looking at the security in wireless sensor networks. These angles 
could cover all the security requirements and issues that we should consider. Figure 19.1 shows a 






(d) Intrusion detection systems
(a) Physical security
(b) Deployment security (sparse or dense, etc.)
(c) Topological security (cluster, hierarchy, tree, etc.)
(d) Wireless communication security
(e) Data security
(a) Application layer security
(b) Transport layer security
(c) Network layer security
(d) Data link layer security
(e) Physical layer security
Security angle 3: Holistic security
Security in
WSN
FIgure 19.1 Three angles of looking at security in wireless sensor networks.
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19.2.1  WSN Security VieWiNg ANgle 1
The first angle is based on the mechanism used to deal with security in WSNs. These mechanisms 
include (a) key management, (b) security routing, (c) secure services, and (d) intrusion detection 
systems.
19.2.2  WSN Security VieWiNg ANgle 2
The second angle could be based on where the security is employed. This angle includes the 
following:
 (a) Physical security, that is, the physical protection of the sensors in a network, tamper-proof 
methods, self-destruction method if cracked by attacker, shielding and camouflaging of 
sensors, etc.
 (b) Deployment security, which is dependent on whether the network is sparsely deployed or 
densely deployed. A densely deployed sensor network may have redundancy in a small 
area, which could find out alternative ways to protect the traffic flow if attacked by attack-
ers in one way or other. Also, based on the deployment types or the method of deployment 
of sensors, the security measures may need different types of prior works. If the network 
is uniformly distributed, the security schemes may be installed uniformly among nodes; 
again a random deployment may require installing security components in key nodes in the 
network that cover the entire network.
 (c) Topological security: Based on the network structure or network formation, the security 
could be different. There are mainly three types of network structures: cluster, tree, and 
hierarchy. In a cluster structure, there is a cluster head in each cluster and some sub-
ordinate nodes under the cluster head. In this formation, instead of installing security 
schemes in each node, cluster heads could be the most suitable entities. This is because 
of the reason that the cluster heads collect data from the other subordinate nodes and 
process those before forwarding it toward the base station. If cluster heads with higher 
computing and energy resources are used in a network, the task becomes easier as they 
can take the load of processing and forwarding secure packets. If the network formation 
is tree-based, the nodes have parent-child relationships among themselves from the leaf 
toward the sink node or vice versa. In such a case, each individual node may include 
security measures, and along a path in a tree, the packets could be checked before for-
warding to the next hop or to the sink node or base station. The third type of network 
formation is hierarchy, in which there are several hierarchical levels of the nodes in the 
network. Say, for example, in one level, there are several clusters with cluster heads and 
subordinate nodes. The cluster heads of this level could be considered as the subordinate 
nodes in another bigger scale cluster (another level), which might have a higher power 
cluster head, and it could be repeated for several levels. A well scalable and large WSN 
with some strategically positioned high power nodes with higher transmission ranges 
could have such a structure. So such a network formation needs security measures in a 
different way than the other two types of formations. The thematic diagrams of all these 
types of network formations are shown later in the chapter when discussing these in rela-
tion to our work (see Section 19.7). Other than these categories, there might be hybrid 
topology in the network, combining different network formation styles, for example, a 
network with partly a cluster structure and partly a tree-based structure. So it becomes 
crucial where the security schemes should be installed so that the network security is 
ensured up to the expected level.
 (d) Wireless communication security: Due to the nature of wireless communications, a WSN 
is always vulnerable. The wireless medium is of an open nature, hence the signaling 
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and reception mechanisms must be secured in the best way possible. An attack such as 
jamming [25], for example, could disrupt the natural wireless transmissions within the 
network.
 (e) The last category is the data security, which includes the encryption and decryption 
of data packets, efficient packet authentication techniques, hop-by-hop checking, and 
so on.
19.2.3  WSN Security VieWiNg ANgle 3
The third angle is the holistic security. This brings forward the concept of layer-wise security in 
such type of network. Based on the very well known OSI (open systems interconnection) refer-
ence model, we could think about ensuring security in each layer. Especially for wireless sensor 
networks, five layers are relevant: application layer, transport layer, network layer, link layer, and 
physical layer. Lack of security in any of these levels weakens the overall security of the network. A 
full working solution in which different mechanisms could work in cooperation is still an open area 
of research, which would take a huge effort to develop. After knowing all these views and angles of 
security in a WSN, in the subsequent section, we will explore the major types of threats and attacks 
against such type of network.
There are several well-known and a few less well-known security attacks that exist in wireless 
sensor networks. In this section, we discuss these security attacks in brief. Almost all of the attacks 
described below focus on the limitations of routing protocols in WSNs. However, some unknown 
attacks that are launched considering other security constraints of the network are presented as 
well. Table 19.1 introduces a brief summary of well-known and less known (or less studied) security 
attacks and their characteristics in terms of attack behaviors and techniques.
table 19.1
security attacks in Wsns
Well known less known (or less studied)
name Characteristics name Characteristics




Bogus message during 
reprogramming [28]
Unsecure reprogramming 
process with bogus messages
Sinkhole/blackhole [29–32] Shortest path, drop the 
packets
External stimuli [33] Use external physical stimuli to 




Selectively drop the 
packets
Homing [33] Hamper the normal functioning 
of cluster heads
The node replication [38,39] Add extra node to the 
network with the same 
cryptographic secrets
Neglect and greed [40] Deny transmission of 
legitimate packets and give 
higher priority to own packets
HELLO flood [41] Flood with HELLO 
packets
Unfairness [40] Unfair resource allocation on 
MAC protocols
Wormhole [42–45] Offer less number of hops 
and less delay, which is 
fake 
Sybil [36,46–48] A malicious node pretends 
to be more than one node
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19.2.4  DeNiAl of SerVice (DoS) AttAckS
We consider any type of intentional activity that can disrupt, subvert, or even destroy the network 
as a denial of service (DoS) attack.
Basically, DoS attacks can be categorized into three types:
•	 Consumption of scarce, limited, or non-renewable resources
•	 Destruction or alteration of configuration information
•	 Physical destruction or alteration of network resources
These types of DoS attacks are the most significant for WSNs as the sensors in the network suf-
fer from the lack of limited resources. Also, DoSs can be categorized according to the layers of the 
network architecture. An attacker can use different tools at different layers to stop proper function-
ing of the entire network or some sensor nodes. Even though it has been said that it is too difficult to 
know whether any particular DoS situation is caused intentionally or unintentionally, there are some 
detection methods that exist to thwart each type of DoS attack [72]. In general terms, DoS means any 
situation that prevents providing proper service that is expected from the network and “DoS attack” 
means any deliberate activity by an entity (or some) that causes DoS (denial of service) in the network.
Jamming and tampering attacks that exist in the physical layer of WSNs are also considered as 
kinds of DoS attacks. Jamming is the deliberate interference with radio reception to deny a target’s 
use of a communication channel. Due to their unpredictable nature, WSNs are very vulnerable to 
“radio channel jamming”–based DoS attack [26]. Tampering is actually any type of physical attack 
on sensors in the network. They might be physical damage or replacing the sensors, parts of compu-
tational or sensitive hardware; one can even extract cryptographic keys to gain unrestricted access 
to higher communication layers. These types of attacks cannot be defended by some system or base 
station; only accurate and effective designer of the network can handle it.
19.2.5  SiNkhole or BlAck hole AttAckS
In this attack, a malicious node acts as a black hole [22] to pull in all the traffic in the network. The 
attacker listens to the route requests and then replies to the target node informing that it has the short-
est path to the base station. A victim node is enticed to select it as a forwarder for its packets. Once the 
malicious node is able to put itself between the base station and the sensor node, it is able to do whatever 
it wants (drop packets, change the content, etc.) with the packets that pass through it. This type of attack 
can be very harmful for sensor nodes that are deployed considerably far from the base station. We have 
to keep in mind that black hole and sinkhole attacks are basically the same attacks by definition. Some 
recent works have addressed this attack, and possible IDSs have been proposed in [19,30–32].
19.2.6  SelectiVe forWArDiNg
Multi-hop networks like WSNs rely on a significant assumption that all nodes in the network will faith-
fully forward the received messages to the base station (BS). In these attacks, a malicious node acts as 
a normal node by forwarding only certain messages but selectively drops sensitive packets, which are 
hard to detect by the system. The specific form of this attack is the sinkhole or black hole attack with 
which a node might drop all messages it receives. As possible solutions to detect this type of attack, 
some secure routing algorithms and IDSs using different techniques have been proposed [3,34,35,37].
19.2.7  the NoDe replicAtioN AttAckS
Due to the resource constraints of sensor nodes and often unattended environment of a WSN, an 
attacker can easily capture the nodes and analyze and replicate them. In this attack, an attacker 
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attempts to add one or more nodes in a network that use the same cryptographic secrets as any other 
legitimate node in that network. This kind of attack may have severe consequences such as cor-
ruption of data by an adversary or even disconnection of some critical parts of the network. Some 
centralized detection schemes with one point of failure, neighborhood voting protocols with the 
lack of detecting distributed node replications, and some successful distributed detection techniques 
have been proposed [38,39].
19.2.8  hello flooD AttAckS
This attack uses HELLO packets as a tool for convincing the sensors in the network. Many of the 
routing protocols require broadcasting of HELLO packets to discover the neighbors. An attacker 
uses this assumption as a weapon to attract the sensor nodes. A node that receives such a packet may 
assume that it is within normal radio range of the sender node. Hence, an attacker with a large radio 
range and enough processing power can send HELLO packets to a large number of sensor nodes by 
flooding the entire network. Thus, the sensor nodes could be persuaded that the adversary is their 
neighbor. Possible solutions to detect this type of attacks could be the use of bidirectional verifica-
tion of links before using them, secure multipath routing, and use of multiple base stations [41].
19.2.9  Wormhole AttAckS
In this attack, an attacker records the packets at one location in the network and tunnels those to 
another location. Wormhole attack is another significant and serious threat to WSNs because this is 
possible even if the attacker has not compromised any node and even if all communications provide 
authenticity and confidentiality. Attackers offer less number of hops and less delay than other normal 
routing paths, which leads to attract the sensor nodes to send data through them. While forwarding 
packets, the attackers can arbitrarily drop sensitive packets. In a recent work, Sharif and Leckie pro-
pose three types of wormhole attacks, namely energy depleting wormhole attack (EDWA), indirect 
wormhole attack (IBA), and targeted energy depleting wormhole attack (TEDWA) [42]. Also, IDS 
using connectivity information to detect the wormhole attacks has been proposed [44]. Other work 
proposes a wormhole detection technique using directional antennas, which is, in most of the cases, 
infeasible for sensor networks due to their limited resources.
19.2.10  SyBil AttAckS
In some applications, the sensor might need to work collaboratively to accomplish a certain task; 
hence, management policy of the network can use distribution of subtasks or redundancy of infor-
mation. In this case, a malicious node can pretend to be more than one node at the same time using 
the identities of other legitimate nodes. An attacker tries to degrade the integrity of data, level of 
security, routing mechanism, data aggregation, and even misbehavior detection techniques. As pos-
sible countermeasures, we can use a logically centralized authority (base station or cluster head) 
in the network. Some recent IDSs could be found in [36,47–49]. Newsome et al. [46] proposed a 
taxonomy of Sybil attacks in WSNs based on three orthogonal dimensions.
19.2.11  other Security AttAckS iN WSNS
There are a few less known (or commonly unknown or less studied) security threats that exist in 
WSNs. These attacks mostly concentrate on service availability (i.e., DoS) of the networks in dif-
ferent layers. We briefly describe them in the following paragraphs.
Bogus message during reprogramming: This attack could be launched in the application layer 
if a WSN application allows reprogramming of the network. Reprogramming of the network may 
be needed for scope selection, encoding-decoding, completion validation, code acquisition, or for 
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network management purposes [28]. If the reprogramming process is not secure enough, the attack-
ers can effectively cut off a portion of the network by using bogus messages.
External stimuli: A possible attack against WSNs in the application layer could be launched by 
using some external physical stimuli. The attacker uses the external stimuli to stimulate the nodes 
with a huge number of events to be sent directly to the base station. However, this attack is not effec-
tive when packets are sent with predefined regular intervals. The possible solution might be using 
an IDS that detects attackers in the network if a particular region creates a large number of packets 
within a short period of time [33].
Homing: Depending on WSN application, some nodes (e.g., cluster heads) are given special 
responsibilities, such as managing keys, maintaining a local group, etc. The adversaries try to han-
dle and eavesdrop on the activities of those leader nodes. In this attack, the attackers hamper the 
normal functioning of leader nodes within a WSN application [33].
Neglect and greed: If a sensor node drops packets or denies transmitting legitimate packets 
or if a node is very greedy to give undue priority to its own messages, then it could be considered 
as a neglecting node. The protocols that are based on dynamic source routing (DSR) are the most 
vulnerable to this type of attack [40].
Unfairness: This attack is a weaker form of DoS attack in the link layer. This attack could 
degrade service for real-time MAC protocols by using unfair resource allocations. In fact, providing 
fairness in WSNs is often viewed as a separate research issue [40].
So far, we have discussed various types of security threats in WSNs. These attacks can be tack-
led by using some successful and efficient countermeasures that will be discussed later. Most of the 
research works basically rely on some statistical assumptions and simulation results. At the time of 
the implementation of those mechanisms in real environments, they might face plenty of difficulties 
due to the unpredictable nature of wireless sensor networks.
19.3  lIterature revIeW
We have talked about the major threats and attacks to investigate the grounds of our work a bit. It is, in 
reality, impossible to tackle all the attacks with a single routing protocol or a single mechanism of any 
kind (unless different parts of the mechanism work in different layers to cover all the security needs, or 
different mechanisms work in collaboration to secure the entire network). However, what we can do is 
the security measures could be blended within the routing mechanism as a first line of defense. Then, 
on top of that, other security mechanisms could work to deal with specific network-related problems 
and issues. Hence, the intent of this chapter is to introduce to the readers such a scheme that could 
give some innovative idea of blending security measures within a routing strategy. There are a few 
prior works that motivate us to devise our mechanism. Although none of them is directly related to our 
proposed solution, the underlying principles are sometimes similar to some of them.
Çam et al. [5] propose an energy-efficient security protocol for wireless sensor networks by using 
symmetric key cryptography and their NOVSF (non-blocking orthogonal variable spreading factor) 
code-hopping technique. They consider a hierarchical architecture of the network in which data are 
routed from sensor nodes to the base station through cluster heads. The basic idea of their protocol is 
to implement two algorithms in the sensor nodes and in the base station, which the sensor nodes and 
the base station would follow at the time of data transmission and reception. To ensure a better level 
of security, they introduced the NOVSF technique, which basically scrambles the data blocks using 
a multiplexer in the system while transmitting data from the sensor nodes. Their scheme is secure 
and energy efficient, considering the fact that it increases the level of security during data transmis-
sion using the NOVSF technique without utilizing any additional power. However, this scrambling 
technique increases the complexity of tasks for the base station as it has to aggregate and reorder 
the incoming data blocks correctly. To address the issue of energy-efficient data aggregation with 
secure data transmission, an ESPDA (energy-efficient secure pattern-based data aggregation) pro-
tocol [6] is proposed. In contrast to the conventional data aggregation protocols, ESPDA avoids the 
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transmission of redundant data from the sensor nodes to the cluster head. To make the data trans-
mission and aggregation more secure, a cluster head is not required to decrypt or encrypt the data 
received from the sensor nodes. On the whole, though, it [5] is an energy-efficient secure protocol; 
it increases the processing burden of the base station and to support the associated ESPDA scheme, 
it requires more energy, which literally ruins the gains of the original scheme.
Ye et al. [7] propose a statistical en-route filtering (SEF) scheme to detect and drop false reports 
during the forwarding process. In their scheme, a report is forwarded only if it contains the message 
authentication codes (MACs) generated by multiple nodes by using keys from different partitions in a 
global key pool. According to their findings, SEF can drop up to 70% of bogus reports injected by a 
compromised node within five hops and reduce energy consumption by 65% or more in many cases.
Zhu et al. [8] propose the interleaved, hop-by-hop authentication scheme that detects false reports 
through interleaved authentication. Their scheme guarantees that the base station can detect a false 
report when no more than t nodes are compromised, where t is a security threshold. In addition, 
their scheme guarantees that t colluding compromised sensors can deceive at most B noncompro-
mised nodes to forward false data they inject, where B is O(t2) in the worst case. They also propose 
a variant of this scheme, which guarantees B = 0 and which works for a small t.
Motivated by [8], Lee and Cho [9] propose an enhanced interleaved authentication scheme called 
the key inheritance-based filtering that prevents forwarding of false reports. In their scheme, the keys 
of each node used in the message authentication consist of the node’s own key and the keys inherited 
from its upstream nodes. Every authenticated report contains the combination of the message authen-
tication codes generated by using the keys of the consecutive nodes in a path from the base station to 
a terminal node. Other than these works, [10–12] focus only on energy efficiency in a wireless sensor 
network and the works like [3,4,13] deal with the security measures for routing in WSN.
After analyzing all these works, we design our protocol in which we create a tree structure in the 
network, based on the energy levels and distances (from the base station) of the sensor nodes. Along 
with the energy-efficient structuring of the network, we initialize an efficient security scheme down 
the paths of the tree to ensure secure data transmission in the network. Security is in fact a vast area 
of research, but our focus of this work is to address secure data transmission from the source sensors 
to the base station along with energy-efficient structuring and operation of the network. We develop 
our protocol in a way in which false injection of data cannot deceive the base station or, more specifi-
cally, cannot reach the base station. We emphasize the authenticity of sensor readings so that, before 
transmitting each packet, the forwarding nodes can detect the irregularities with a minimum effort 
and thus drop unnecessary or flawed packets. By stopping the false packets traveling a long distance 
along the created paths in the network, our mechanism helps for greater energy efficiency as the inter-
mediate nodes are thus saved from extra transmissions. For employing the entire protocol, we develop 
it in a way that before starting its operation for secure data transmission, the network is formed in an 
energy-efficient way. Periodic restructuring of the network is proposed to keep a balance among the 
nodes to dissipate energies in nearly equal proportion. Our goal here is to achieve maximum lifetime 
of the network with secure data transmission from any source sensor to the base station.
19.4  assumptIons and prelImInarIes
19.4.1  SeNSor DeploymeNt AND NetWork moDel
We consider a wireless sensor network with densely deployed sensing devices. The deployment 
could be made by aerial or vehicular scattering or by physical installation. We assume that, initially, 
all the nodes and the base station in the network have the same transmission range (say r). Like 
μTESLA [24], our protocol requires that the base station and nodes are loosely time synchronized, 
and each node knows an upper bound on the maximum synchronization error. The base station has 
enough energy to support the network’s operations for its full lifetime. The sensors deployed in the 
network have the computational, memory, communication, and power resources such as the current 
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generation of sensor nodes (e.g., MICA2 motes [14]). Once the sensors are deployed over the target 
area, they remain relatively static in their respective positions. That means the nodes do not move 
with respect to their neighbor. The transmissions of each node are isotropic (i.e., in all directions) 
so that each message sent is a local broadcast within the transmission range of the node. The link 
between any pair of nodes in the network is bidirectional, that is, if a node ni gets a node nj within 
its transmission range (i.e., one hop), nj also gets ni as its one-hop neighbor.
An accurate model for the energy consumption per bit at the physical layer is given by
 E E d Eelec
trans
elec
recv= + +β α  (19.1)
where Eelec
trans is the distance-independent amount of energy consumed by the transmitter electronics 
(PLLs, VCOs, bias currents) and digital processing, Eelec
recv is the energy utilized by receiver electron-
ics, and βdα accounts for the radiated power necessary to transmit over a distance d between source 
and destination. As in [15,16] we assume that




elec= =  (19.2)
So overall energy consumption between source and destination within one hop can be calculated 
using
 E = 2.Eelec + βdα (19.3)
Broadly speaking, hierarchical routing protocols use control packets for topology construction 
phase. For a particular node i, control packet transmission cost can be calculated by
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where, α is the path loss exponent (2 < α < 5), β is a constant [joule/bit.m2], r is the transmission 
range, Lctrl is the length of control packet in bits, nbri is the average number of neighbors of node i 
for range r, LE is the energy needed by the transceiver circuitry to transmit or receive a packet, and 
T is the time period between two consecutive restructurings of the network.
For a particular path p, data communication cost from source i to the base station can be repre-
sented as
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Here, N is the total number of nodes in the network, i,j ∈0, 1, 2, ..., N is the node index, p is the 
path associated for data transmission from source i to sink, di is the transmission range set by node 
i, di,j is the distance between the node i and j, nfrdp (di) indicates the number of forwarding nodes 
for a path p and range d, nbrp (di) indicates the number of neighboring nodes for a path p and range 
d, Ldata is the length of data packets in bits, and, finally, α and β are same as the previous equation. 
Total communication cost for sending a data packet from source i is
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The observations from the above equation are the following:
•	 Wasteful (due to idle listening, overhearing, etc.) energy consumption increases as the 
number of redundant forwarder increases.
•	 Wasteful energy consumption increases as the number of idle nodes increases.
•	 Energy consumption increases exponentially as the distance between nodes increases.
•	 Frequency of control packet transmission is proportional to the energy consumption.
To reduce energy consumption, the following things could be done:
•	 Reducing the number of forwarding nodes (not hampering the level of connectivity and the 
reliability of the network)
•	 Putting a certain portion of the nodes in sleep mode to reduce idle mode energy consumption
•	 Employing adaptive transmission range according to the distance from the forwarder node 
to save energy
•	 Fixing the network restructuring frequency to ensure balanced energy consumption
19.4.2  BASic termS AND DefiNitioNS
We consider three states of the nodes in our protocol during its operation:
Non-forwarding – Nodes keep their radio transceivers “off” but continue to sense the events 
in their sensing ranges using sensing circuitry. Sensing of any event turns on the radio of 
a non-forwarding node.
Forwarding – Both the transceiver and sensing circuits remain “on” in this state.
Active – During the tree construction and OHC initialization phase (later described in Section 
19.4.1), all nodes remain in the active state. In the active state, both the sensing and radio 
circuitries of the sensors remain “on.” Basically, there is no major difference between for-
warding and the active state. We term these two states to differentiate the two phases in 
our protocol (explained later).
Active State Time. Let v be a node and N1(v) be the number of one-hop neighbors of v for a par-
ticular transmission range r (r is same for all nodes in the network, including the sink). Let Trtt be 
the round trip time for data propagation between the longest distant pair within one-hop neighbors. 
Then, the active state time for node v is given by the equation
 Tactive = Trtt × N1(v)
In our protocol, within the time Tactive, a node could be able to determine whether it should par-
ticipate in the tree as a forwarding node or not.
One-way Hash Chain (OHC). To ensure security for data transmissions from the sensors to the 
base station, we use pre-stored shared secret keys and a one-way hash chain. A one-way hash chain 
[17] is a sequence of numbers generated by one-way function F that has the property that for a given 
x, it is easy to compute y = F(x). However, given F and y, it is computationally infeasible to deter-
mine x, such that x = F–1(y). A one-way hash chain (OHC) is a sequence of numbers Kn, Kn–1, …, K0, 
such that, ∀i : 0 ≤ i < n, Ki = F(Ki+1). To generate an OHC, first a random number Kr is selected as 
the seed, and then F is applied successively on Kr to generate other numbers in the sequence. In the 
next section, we describe in detail how the shared secret keys are used with OHC in our protocol to 
provide data transmission security.
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It should be noted here that in this chapter we have used the terms base station and sink 
interchangeably.
19.4.3  Security ASSumptioNS AND threAt moDel
The base station could not be compromised in any way. We assume that no node could be com-
promised by any adversary while creating the tree structure in the network (i.e., the first phase of 
our scheme). This particular assumption is necessary to protect the network from being wrongly 
structured or to prevent the inclusion of any rouge entity in the network. In this case, we are mainly 
assuming that compromising a node with physical capture is not possible. Also some other attacks, 
such as jamming, could hamper proper relaying of the control messages. We assume that, at least in 
the tree structuring process, any physical capture or jamming attack is not done by any adversary. 
In fact, such types of initial attacks (for example, Hello Flood attack [3]) could be another topic for 
research. In this chapter, our focus is to secure the data transmissions from the source sensors to 
the base station, and addressing jamming or physical capture are beyond the scope of this work. 
Initially, each node is equally trusted by the base station.
Each node in the network has a unique shared secret key with the base station. These keys are 
pre-stored into the sensors’ memories so that, after deployment, the sensors could use the keys to 
encrypt data while sending it to the base station. The base station keeps an index of the IDs of the 
sensors and the corresponding shared secret keys. Due to the use of wireless communications, the 
nodes in the network are vulnerable to various kinds of attacks. We assume that an adversary could 
try to eavesdrop on all traffic, inject false packets, and replay older packets. If, in any case, a node 
is compromised, it could be a full compromise in which all the information stored in that particular 
sensor are exposed to the adversary or could be a partial compromise, that is, partial information 
is exposed.
19.5  seCure energy-eFFICIent routIng protoCol (serp)
19.5.1  tree coNStructioN AND ohc iNitiAlizAtioN phASe
We consider distances and residual energies of the nodes to construct a sink rooted tree (SRT) in the 
network. At the time of the tree construction, all nodes keep their radio transceivers “on” to verify 
whether it should remain active as a forwarding node or not. A timer parameter is defined to ensure 
each node’s active participation in this process for a specific period of time. Each node is prioritized 
for transmission according to its residual energy and distance from the sink.
Now, according to our assumption, all the sensors and the base station have shared secret keys 
that are pre-stored before deployment of the network. So when the sensors are deployed in the target 
area randomly, each sensor contains a shared secret key with the base station, which could be used 
to provide confidentiality of the reports. However, to provide authenticity of the transmitted data, 
all the intermediate nodes between any source node and the base station must be initialized with the 
basic one-way hash chain number. Let us suppose the initial OHC number is IOHC = HS0.
To initiate the first phase of network structuring and OHC number initialization, the base station 
B generates a control packet containing HS0, a MAC (message authentication code) for the control 
packet using the key Ki along with some other parameters. Here, Ki is the number in the key chain 
corresponding to time slot ti. The format of the control packet is
 bcm: B|sid|ren|dist|fid|HS0|MACKi(B|sid|ren|dist|fid|HS0)
where, sid indicates the sender’s ID, ren is the remaining energy of the sender, dist is the cal-
culated cumulative distance to reach the sink using forwarding node(s), and fid is the ID of the 
upstream node (i.e., immediate parent or immediate forwarding node) selected by the current node 
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for forwarding data toward the sink. The sink node initiates bcm with sender ID B, and the values 
of sid, ren, dist, and fid as –1 as, according to our assumption, the base station has unlimited energy 
compared to the energies of the sensors in the network, and in this case, no forwarding node is 
needed to reach itself.
When the BS transmits bcm, at first, its one-hop neighbors get the message. Receiving the mes-
sage, each node in the one-hop neighborhood of the base station first calculates its distance (i.e., 
dist) from the base station based on the received signal strength, stores the value of HS0 and sets B as 
its forwarder node (the ultimate destination is the base station). Now, each of these nodes transmits 
the message again within its own one-hop neighborhood (i.e., local broadcast). In this case, the sid 
is set to its own ID, ren is its own residual energy, and the MAC part is kept the same as the base 
station message, bcm. To ensure prioritization of the transmission of control messages, each node 
waits for a threshold time before each further transmission. Waiting time of a node before further 
transmission is defined by
 Twait = {Ds/Er} × R (19.7)
where Ds is the cumulative distance between the sink and the node, Er is the residual energy of 
the node, and R is a constant that is needed to normalize the value of Twait. As with the course of 
time, the sensors lose their energy levels, and the value of the ratio of distance and residual energy 
increases; we need to normalize this value. In our case, R is the ratio of the node’s initial energy and 
transmission range.
Each node receiving the control messages from one or more upstream neighboring nodes first 
calculates the distance of each sender based on the received signal strength, then calculates the 
cumulative distances up to the sink via different possible forwarders (i.e., the upstream senders), 
stores the ID and residual energy information of each sender, and stores HS0 from the message sent 
by the first sender. To choose its forwarder node, it compares the values of the distance and energy 
ratios (Ds/Er) of the neighboring upstream nodes and chooses the node with the least value of the 
ratio as its forwarder node. It then senses the channel, and if the channel is idle, it waits for Twait 
time and then retransmits the message containing its own status information and with its chosen 
forwarder node ID as its fid. As the selected upstream node could also get the message (as the link 
between any two nodes is bidirectional), it sets itself as a forwarding node for this transmitting node. 
This process continues, and eventually a tree structure is created in the network in which each node 
has a forwarder node on the way to reach the base station and possibly one or more downstream 
nodes that can send data to it destined to the base station. Here, the value of Twait depends mainly on 
the values of Er and Ds. In fact, these values are used to set the priority of the nodes to be selected 
as forwarding nodes.
To authenticate HS0, B releases the key Ki in time slot ti+d. Here, d is the delay parameter for the 
time slot, which could be set depending on the application at hand. It indicates after how many time 
slots the key for time slot i should be released. On receiving this key, a node can verify the integrity 
and source authentication of HS0. Thus, along each path, the initial OHC number is initialized. It is 
to be noted that bcm won’t bring any attack against the network even if the nodes on the other side 
of the network don’t receive Ki at ti+d. Because the messages that are MACed by Ki are supposed 
to be sent out at time slot t, an adversary cannot launch any attacks with Ki when it gets Ki at ti+d. 
Within the time Tactive, a node that does not get any message from any of its neighbors that it should 
be a forwarding node, sets itself as a non-forwarding node. Figure 19.2 shows the sample input and 
output networks.
19.5.2  NetWork operAtioN AND Secure DAtA trANSmiSSioN phASe
We construct the sink rooted tree (SRT) based on the energy levels and distances of the nodes. After 
the tree is constructed within the network, all nodes are either in forwarding or non-forwarding 
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states. Nodes with the non-forwarding state turn off their radio transceivers while keeping the sens-
ing circuitry “on.” On the other hand, forwarding nodes keep both radio and sensing circuitry 
“on.” All nodes try to sense any change of parameters (such as temperature, pressure, magnetism, 
etc. based on the duty assigned to the nodes) within their vicinities, and upon detecting any event, 
the non-forwarding nodes turn their radios on and transmit data toward the base station via their 
selected forwarding nodes.
To send the data securely to the sink, each source node ns maintains a unique one-way hash 
chain, HS: < HSn, HSn–1, …, HS1, HS0 >. When a source node ns sends a report to the sink using the 
path created in the sink-rooted tree (for example, a path is ns → … → nm–1 → nm → B), it encrypts the 
packet with its shared secret key with the base station, including its own ID and an OHC sequence 
number from HS in the packet. It attaches HS1 for the first packet, HS2 for the second packet, and so 
on. To validate an OHC number, each intermediate node n1, …, nm maintains a verifier Ins for each 
source node ns. Initially, Ins for a particular source node is set to HS0. When ns sends the ith packet, 
it includes HSi with the packet.
When any intermediate node nk receives this packet, it verifies whether I F HSn is = ( ) or not. If so, 
nk validates the packet, it forwards it to the next intermediate node, and sets Ins to HSi. In general, 
nk can choose to apply the verification test iteratively up to a fixed number w times, checking at 
each step whether, I F F F HSn is = ( ( ( ))) . If the packet is not validated after the verification process 
has been performed w times, nk simply drops the packet. By performing the verification process 
w times, up to a sequence of w packet losses can be tolerated, and the value of w depends on the 
average packet loss rate of the network. An intermediate node need not decrypt the packet; rather it 
can check the authenticity of the packet before forwarding to its immediate forwarder. Figure 19.3 
illustrates these.
In Figure 19.3a, the source node ns sends the first packet to the base station with the OHC 
value HS1. The content of the packet is encrypted with the secret key that it shares with the base 
station. Getting the packet, the base station performs the authenticity check by verifying the hash 
chain number and gets the report by decrypting it with the shared key for that particular source 
node. Figure 19.3b shows a scenario in which the packet P2 could not reach the base station for 
some reason. In spite of that, the OHC verification is not hampered as for the next packet the 
third intermediate node performs the hash verification twice (Figure 19.3c). Here, at the very 
first attempt ,it cannot get the value of HS1 in the verification process, but in the second iteration, 
























































FIgure 19.2 A portion of an example network (a) before execution of the first phase. All the white nodes 
are in active status (b) after execution of the first phase. The gray nodes are in non-forwarding status while the 
other two nodes are in forwarding status. We have shown the N-hop (N = 1, 2, 3, …) neighbors of the sink on 
the circumference of the same circle regardless of their actual calculated distances from the sink.
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perform the hash number verification w times, and w is an application-dependent parameter. In 
Figure 19.3d an adversary tries to send a bogus packet with a false hash chain number, and it is 
detected in the next upstream node. Eventually, such a bogus packet fails to pass the authentica-
tion check and is dropped in the very next hop. This feature saves energy of the network as such 
falsely injected packets cannot travel through the network for more than one hop. After the tree 
construction, at the time of data transmission, each node could dynamically set its transmission 
range according to the distance of the parent or immediate forwarding node. If the distance of the 
forwarding node is less than the initially used transmission range for tree construction, the node 
decreases the range by decreasing the transmission energy. This feature gives the flexibility in 
our protocol to dynamically set the transmission ranges, and thus it helps for conserving network-
wide energy.
The first phase is executed after every T time, and T is an application-dependent parameter. T 
depends on the event generation rate as well as on the load of the network. Each node participating 
in tree construction should have at least a certain level of energy.
19.5.3  optioNAl key refreShmeNt
To provide data freshness and to increase the level of security, our scheme has an optional key 
refreshment mechanism. In this case, the base station periodically broadcasts a new session key to 
the sensors in the network. The format for this message is
 B|Ks| MACKj(B|Ks))
where Kj is the number in the key chain number corresponding to time slot tj. To authenticate Ks, 
like the OHC initialization phase, B releases the key Kj in time slot tj+d. On receiving this key, the 
nodes can verify the integrity and source authentication of Ks. Then each node gets the new key by 
performing an X-OR (exclusive OR) operation with its old shared key. This method could also be 
utilized for refreshing the keys of a specific number of nodes. In that case, the base station could 
simply send the Ks to the specific node by encrypting it with its previous shared secret key. Upon 
receiving the new key, the node can perform the X-OR operation and could use the newly derived 
key for subsequent data transmissions.
Changing encryption keys from time to time has an advantage as it guarantees data freshness in 
the network. Moreover, it helps to maintain confidentiality of the transmitted data by preventing the 
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FIgure 19.3 (a) Authenticated packet delivery to the base station using the OHC numbers, (b) an example 
scenario in which the packet could not reach the base station, (c) but it cannot affect the OHC verification 
technique, (d) a bogus packet with a false HS value is dropped by an intermediate node.
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19.5.4  repAiriNg A BrokeN pAth AND ohc re-iNitiAlizAtioN
If, in any case, any node between the source node and the base station fails, it could make one or 
more paths useless. Eventually, in such a case, all the downstream nodes along that particular path 
get disconnected from the base station. To repair such a broken path, we use the stored upstream 
knowledge of the sensors. We know that, in the first phase, each downstream node stores the IDs of 
the one-hop upstream senders of the control message. So this knowledge could be used for repairing 
the path quickly.
Let us illustrate it with an example. Say, in Figure 19.2b, node 5 is somehow damaged or failed 
to continue (Figure 19.4a). So the nodes 4, 6, and 7 get disconnected from the base station. This 
failure could first be detected by the one-hop neighbors of node 5 in the tree, i.e., nodes 4, 6, 7, and 
node 3. In the first phase, as node 4 got a message from node 1, which tried to become its forwarder, 
node 4 could use that knowledge to repair the path. So node 4 first does a local broadcast of an error 
message that it has lost its previous forwarder and sets node 1 as its forwarder. Accordingly, node 
1 gets a forwarding status. If there were more senders who had sent control messages to node 4 at 
the time of tree construction, node 4 would have chosen the node with the least distance and energy 
ratio as recorded earlier. We know that in the first phase, each node stores the information about 
its neighbors who try to become its forwarder. If node 4 is required to send any packet as a source 
node, it could simply send it using the OHC number in the sequence, HSk+1, which is next to its last-
used OHC number, HSk. For node 1, node 4 is a new source, so it could save its HS value in I4. The 
subsequent transmissions from node 4 are verified by node 1 based on this initial knowledge. There 
are other two stranded nodes in our example, node 6 and node 7. In the similar fashion, these nodes 
use their stored knowledge. The structure of the new path after broken path recovery is shown in 
Figure 19.4b.
As we are considering a highly dense deployment scenario, we think that, in most of the cases, 
a node might initially get two or more upstream senders who would try to be its forwarder. This 
procedure works fine as long as no more than w packets are lost on the way from any source node 
(after a path is broken due to a node failure). If, within the time of repairing the path, more than w 
packets are lost from a particular source, the OHC chain along that path breaks down. In fact, this is 
the worst case in which all the downstream nodes along the path become invalid to the base station 
and their sent data are discarded on the way to reach the base station. To overcome this problem, 
the entire OHC initialization phase (the first phase of our protocol) could be made periodic (after an 
certain interval, which is an application-dependent parameter). Determining the best possible time 












































FIgure 19.4 (a) Node 5 failed; (b) repairing a broken path. White nodes are in forwarding status, and gray 
nodes are in non-forwarding status.
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19.6  sImulatIon results and perFormanCe analysIs
19.6.1  SimulAtioN
To understand the performance of our proposed protocol, we simulated the network in NS-2 [18] 
with 50 to 300 nodes uniformly distributed in a 100 m × 100 m square sensor field. The transmission 
range of each sensor node was set to 25 m. Each node was provided with 2 Joule of initial energy. 
Transmitter and receiver electronics were set to dissipate 50 nJ/bit.m2. The data packet length was 
set to 2 KB. The sink or base station was located at (150, 150) coordinate. We varied the number of 
sources from 1 to 7, and the data generation interval was randomly chosen. Initially, tree construc-
tion time was set to 10 seconds. As our protocol creates a hierarchical structure in the network, we 
compared our protocol with two other hierarchical energy-aware routing protocols LEACH [10] and 
EAD [11]. All the simulation parameters are shown in Table 19.2.
After the construction of the sink rooted tree, some of the nodes are selected as the forwarding 
nodes. The size of the set of forwarding nodes indicates at least how many nodes are needed to stay 
awake for data transmission. A small set of forwarding nodes is desirable for minimizing the rout-
ing overhead. The smaller the size of the set of forwarders, the better the energy efficiency is for the 
network as more nodes could be in the non-forwarding status. Figure 19.5a shows the percentage 
of forwarding nodes among the total number of nodes in LEACH, EAD, and our protocol. Now, 
an interesting feature to note for the Figure 19.5a is that as the number of nodes in the network 
grows, the percentage of cluster heads decreases slightly for LEACH because more nodes become 
associated with a single cluster head in the network. For the reason of dense deployment, relatively 
more nodes are covered by a cluster head. Thus, the percentage of cluster heads (forwarding nodes) 
becomes slightly lower than the suggested percentage of cluster heads as the number of nodes 
increases in the network.
Figure 19.5b shows the energy dissipation given a number of source nodes. Less energy dissipa-
tion eventually helps for increasing the lifetime of the network. The relative gain of our proposed 
scheme compared to LEACH and EAD increases with the increase of number of sources. More 
sources issue more data to be transmitted. In case of LEACH, each transmission requires one hop to 
reach the cluster head and one hop to reach to the sink. In case of EAD, multiple hops are required to 
reach to the sink. As wireless transmission power varies depending on distance, for the same packet 
size, LEACH requires much higher energy for transmission. EAD requires less energy than that of 
LEACH as it uses multiple hops (hence, less transmission range). As our algorithm uses adaptive 
transmission range, the amount of energy consumption is much less than LEACH and EAD, con-
sidering the same packet size.
table 19.2
simulation parameters
Simulation time 1300 s
Simulation area 100 × 100 m2
Total number of nodes 50 ~ 300
Initial energy 2 J
Transmit/receive electronics (LE) 50 nJ/bit/m2
Transmission power 5.85 e – 5 watt
Receive signal threshold 3.152 e – 20 watt
Sleep mode energy 0
Number of sources 1 ~ 7
Offered load 4 ~ 6 pkts. per s (pps)
Transmission range 25 m
Packet size 2048 bytes
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Figure 19.6a and 19.6b present the number of alive nodes versus simulation time with 50 and 100 
nodes. Our proposed scheme generates a fewer number of forwarding nodes compared to EAD. As 
a result, the energy dissipation is much less than that of EAD as there are less nodes participating 
actively in the network operation phase. Also adaptive transmission range saves more energy for 
the same packet size. Single hop transmission, the main drawback of LEACH, leads to huge energy 
consumption for data transmission. Our experimental results show that our algorithm achieves bet-
ter lifetime compared to LEACH and EAD.
19.6.2  StorAge requiremeNt for oNe-WAy hASh chAiN
The method of generating and storing a long OHC in a sensor node is a little difficult. Naive algo-
rithms require either too much memory to store every OHC number or too much time to compute 
the next OHC number. None of these algorithms are practical on resource-constrained sensor nodes. 
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FIgure 19.5 (a) Percentage of forwarding nodes in total number of nodes in the network, (b) energy dis-
sipation for different number of sources in LEACH, EAD, and SERP.
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proposed [19–21]. Among these algorithms, the fractal graph traversal algorithm [19] could perform 
well on the traditional sensor nodes. This algorithm stores only some of the intermediate numbers, 
called pebbles, of an OHC, and uses them to compute other numbers. If the size of an OHC is n 
(there are total n numbers in this OHC), the algorithm performs approximately 1
2 2
log n one-way 
function operations to compute the next OHC number and requires a little more than log2 n units of 
memory to save pebbles.
The length of an OHC that is needed for a source node is also an important factor. The typical 
length is between 211 to 222. If the length of an OHC is 222, and a node uses one OHC number per 
second, it will take more than a month to exhaust all numbers from this chain. Figure 19.7a shows 
the storage requirements for storing pebbles for different lengths of an OHC. This includes a skip-
jack-based one-way function and OHC generation based on [19]. We see that a node needs about 930 
bytes to maintain an OHC of length 222. This includes a 256-byte lookup table for skipjack, which 
can be shared with other applications. Other than this, each node has to store only a few IDs and 
neighbor information of its one-hop neighbors. Overall, the memory requirement for our scheme 
could be well afforded with today’s sensor nodes.
19.6.3  Security ANAlySiS
We analyze the security of our scheme with respect to two design goals: the ability of the base sta-
tion to detect a false report and the ability of the nodes en route to filter or detect false reports.
Base Station Detection: In our scheme, whenever the base station receives a report from any 
sensor, it first checks the ID of the sensor, checks the authenticity of the report by verifying the one-
way hash chain number for that particular source, looks for the corresponding shared secret key, and 
decrypts the packet. The base station could not be compromised in any way. So it is in fact the final 
entity that could confirm the authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity of the transmitted reports. 
Our security scheme is designed in a way that, any bogus report cannot reach the base station; 
rather it would be detected and dropped by the intermediate nodes. However, if, somehow, a bogus 
packet is sent directly to the base station, it would certainly be discarded by it for the failure of the 
authentication check. If in any application, the optional key refreshment mechanism is employed, 
once the time slot of releasing the new session key is over, the base station first tries to decrypt the 
incoming packets from any particular source with the X-ORed new key for that node. In case it 
produces a garbage result, the base station tries with the previous shared secret key with that node 
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FIgure 19.7 (a) Memory requirement for OHC generation; (b) Number of alive nodes versus time for two 
cases: without packet authentication and with packet authentication (2 ~ 4 attackers generating bogus packets).
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newly computed key for that node). This case might happen when somehow some node cannot get 
the new session key released by the base station.
Detection by the Intermediate Nodes: Two types of attempts from the adversaries are considered:
Outsider Attack: In this case, as shown in Figure 19.3d, if an outsider node generates a packet 
with a fake OHC number, the authentication must be failed in the very next node in the path, and as 
a result, this packet would never be forwarded even to the node that is only two hops away from it. 
Simple verification of the OHC number prohibits the forwarding of such bogus packets.
Insider Attack: If a legitimate node along any path is compromised, the attacker could grab the OHC 
sequence and the shared secret key with the base station. However, it should be noted that, to use the 
OHC numbers successfully, the adversary should also know the last OHC number used by that particular 
node to send the packet to the base station. If it gets the last-used OHC number, then it could use this for 
sending false packets successfully. Otherwise, any arbitrary use of the OHC number from that source 
might not be forwarded by the next intermediate node because of authentication failure. Now, in case of 
a node that is fully compromised, that is, if the adversary obtains all the required information, it actually 
gets the status of a legitimate node in the network. This fully compromised node could be used to gener-
ate false reports with valid authentication numbers. To prevent such type of malicious adversary, there 
are several factors that come into play to detect the abnormal behavior of the node. In our scheme, the 
base station considers a report legitimate if it is reported by at least δ number of source nodes in the net-
work, where δ is an application-dependent parameter. So the different or modified reports from a single 
source cannot convince the base station about any event. Also the base station could notice the amount of 
packets generated by a particular source. These are basically a part of an intrusion detection system (IDS) 
implemented in the base station. The detailed description of the IDS is beyond the scope of this work.
The worst case scenario occurs if more than δ number of nodes in a particular region in the 
network are somehow compromised. This sort of collaborative and large-scale attack is handled by 
the periodic restructuring of the whole network. Finding an optimal value of the time interval for 
periodic restructuring is kept as our future works.
In Figure 19.7b, we show the number of alive nodes versus simulation time considering the 
packet authenticity checking method and without checking. We considered two to four attackers 
in addition to the number of actual source nodes. The graph shows that if the detection method is 
absent, the nodes lose energy rapidly, which causes a shorter network lifetime. The result is plotted 
for total of 100 nodes in the network. In this experiment, four to 16 packets per second (pps) were 
generated by the attackers to drain energy of the nodes. When the packet authentication method is 
employed, the nodes can detect false packets, and by dropping those other intermediate nodes, are 
relieved from the burden of forwarding false reports.
As a whole, the efficiency of our protocol is increased with the number of false packets transmit-
ted by the attackers. The more false packets that are tried to be sent by the adversaries, the more 
gain we have as those packets cannot travel a long distance toward the base station and thus save the 
network from consuming unnecessary energy by extra forwarding or transmission. This is, in fact, 
very helpful for the longer lifetime of the network in a heavy flooding attack in which the attackers 
try to inject a huge number of false packets into the network data flow.
19.7  dIsCussIon on ImplementIng an Ids WIth serp
As we noted earlier, the description of a complete IDS is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, 
in this section, we briefly discuss the implementation of an IDS alongside SERP, considering dif-
ferent WSN structures. Depending on the network structure used, the location of the employed 
IDS could be different, which could also affect various parameters in the network. The objective 
of putting this section is to link up some IDS techniques that could be considered for a network in 
which SERP is used as the routing protocol. While SERP provides partial protection by providing 
authentication of packets and minimizing the energy drain, any IDS in particular locations of the 
network could give the rest of the protection that the network needs for its overall security.
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WSN is a highly application-dependent network. Hence, network structures vastly differ depend-
ing on the application types. We have discussed the major structures in the introductory section in 
a more detailed way. However, in this part, for the convenience of the readers, we are recapping the 
gist of the previously noted information to relate IDS with current discussion:
•	 Tree based – In this structure, the base station plays the role of the main parent node (i.e., 
root), and sensor nodes take the roles of leaf nodes or intermediate nodes. The one-hop 
neighbor nodes of the base station can become parent nodes for the second hop neighbor 
nodes, and this method continues to cover the entire network in this fashion.
•	 Cluster based – In this scenario, the network is divided into clusters with the main base 
station. Every cluster has its own selected cluster head (CH), which is the medium between 
cluster members and the base station. In addition, cluster heads are often allowed to com-
municate among themselves for some specific purposes.
•	 Hierarchical – The network is organized into a tree-like structure with several different 
types of clusters in it. This structure may have several layers representing parent-child type 
relationships (at least thematically). Note that this is different than a hybrid model in which 
a portion of the network is cluster based while some other portion is tree based and some 
other portion may be of hierarchical structure or combination of all.
Figure 19.8 illustrates these network structures with possible IDS locations at which IDSs can func-


















FIgure 19.8 Three types of network structures with possible IDS locations. (a) Tree-based, (b) Gluster-
based and, (c) Hierarchial.
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IDS could have several mobile agents in leaf nodes and a global agent in parent node (i.e., base station). 
This helps the IDS to detect attacks with higher accuracy at the same time maintaining less resource [50].
Furthermore, we believe that it would be very efficient to have one IDS agent for a group of sen-
sor nodes (i.e., installed on a cluster head) in cluster-based network structures. Assuming that cluster 
heads are slightly more powerful devices than their cluster members, we can implement powerful 
IDS modules on them (which may not be efficient on typical sensor nodes).
It might be a challenging problem to select the perfect IDS locations for hierarchical struc-
ture, which includes both tree-based and cluster-based network structures (thematically). Hence, 
we advise using a combination of mobile agents between layers and static agents in cluster heads.
19.8  ConClusIons and Future expeCtatIons
In this chapter, we considered a dense deployment scenario of WSNs and have proposed an energy-
aware routing protocol that ensures data transmission security for the network. According to our 
design goals, our protocol structures the network in an energy-efficient way; the base station or 
the intermediate nodes can detect the presence of falsely injected data, and the network is robust 
enough to node failures. In this work, in case of security, we have mainly considered the delivery of 
authenticated and encrypted data from the sensors to the base station. To cover various aspects of 
security in WSN, alongside presenting our protocol, we offered a comprehensive discussion on the 
features of security that could be considered for such type of network. Also, we offered a discus-
sion on the usage of an intrusion detection system alongside our proposed mechanism to ensure a 
complete security architecture for an implemented wireless sensor network with maximum security 
features maintaining the requirement of energy efficiency.
Other security schemes could be built upon our scheme to protect the network from other types 
of attacks, if any. In fact, there is a lot of scope to extend the work further. As an example, it could 
be an interesting topic to find out an optimal value of the time interval for periodic restructuring of 
the network, so that the maximum longevity of the network could be ensured.
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